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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States have broadened the 
public sector’s role in providing “protective goods and services” to include homeland security in 
addition to national security and public safety (e.g. police and fire protection). Although it is 
acknowledged that the federal government has a clear responsibility for taking the lead in 
shaping homeland security policies, the provision of greater homeland security involves 
significant participation by state and local governments, and the private sector, in addition to the 
national government.  
This paper briefly summarizes why private markets are likely to under-invest in 
homeland security, leading to a need for public action. It provides an overview of both the range 
of budgetary and non-budgetary tools used by the United States (U.S.) federal government to 
“finance” the provision of homeland security, and the budgetary and non-budgetary cost of these 
federal actions. The paper also identifies and discusses some of the principle challenges faced in 
ensuring federal homeland security dollars are “well-spent.” While the analysis focuses on the 
United States, the tools of government employed are applicable to all sovereign nations. 
 
Why the Government Should Intervene 
The classic “market failure paradigm” provides three broad rationales for public sector 
involvement in the provision of homeland security. First, increasing homeland security involves 
financing and providing public goods, whose consumption is non-rival, and also non-excludable. 
Some of these public goods, such as protection of borders are national in scope; others, such as 
protection of critical infrastructure, harbors, and “national icons” (such as the Statue of Liberty 
or the Golden Gate Bridge) provide some benefits that are national in scope, but also have 
benefits that are clearly concentrated locally and/or regionally.  
In addition, 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructures identified by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are owned by the private sector1. While owners of 
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these structures have an incentive to protect their facilities, the cost of an attack to society 
exceeds the cost to the owner. In such cases, there are external benefits from protecting 
infrastructure, and private spending on homeland security may be less than socially optimal. 
There are also other cases, such as airline screening of baggage, where achieving a socially 
optimal amount of screening requires coordination/cooperation among multiple private parties, 
which may be more readily achievable with government guidance and intervention than without. 
In still other cases, private efforts at hardening infrastructure can actually impose negative 
externalities by shifting terrorist threats elsewhere in society. As in the case of the baggage 
screening example, such cases may call for public intervention to minimize the adverse effects of 
such threat-shifting. Thus, the rationale for government intervention in homeland security is 
premised on the existence of a number of classical economics market failures – public goods, 
high transaction costs, and externalities. 
In addition to classical market failures, the attacks of September 11th have raised the 
specter of a new and potentially very costly business risk. As in the case of natural hazards, such 
as floods and hurricanes, private insurance markets face challenges in providing coverage against 
such risks, and as in the case of natural hazards, the government may have a role to play in either 
providing some measure of insurance, or in facilitating the emergence of private insurance 
markets. 
The public sector has a range of policy tools at its disposal for attempting to respond to 
these market failures. Some of these tools are budgetary in nature, such as direct spending and 
grant programs, and possible tax incentives for private security-related investments. In addition, 
government has at its disposal non-budgetary tools, such as regulation, which in principle can be 
used to encourage private parties to make more socially efficient private investments in 
homeland security measures. Lastly, in the case of insurance market failures, governments can 
use “implicit budget mechanisms” such as promises to “back-up” private insurance reserves, as a 
means of supporting insurance markets. While the following paper looks at the tools employed 
by the U.S. government, homeland security is a public good in all nations and the authors 
anticipate that the findings of this paper will apply to other situations. 
 
Budgetary Tools: Federal Spending on Homeland Security 
 We begin with an overview of total federal spending on increasing homeland security. A 
citizen might think that such outlays are concentrated in the U.S. DHS, which was created to 
consolidate resources from across the executive branch to transform and realign the efforts of the 
agencies that have input in securing the nation against terrorism. Even after the creation of the 
DHS, however, other U.S. Government departments and agencies have a critical role in this 
process with the result that spending programs are scattered throughout the federal budget in 
many different agencies. Hence, it is a challenge to provide an overview of how much money is 
being spent and on what at the federal level.  
 Figure 1 displays the U.S. federal budget appropriations for Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006, 
along with the President’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2007, by the executive level 
departments that received the budget appropriations. Each year, the DHS has received the most 
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funds, followed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). However, it should be noted that the 
“Other Departments” category entails budget appropriations to 27 different departments, 
agencies or commissions. In Fiscal Year 2006, total federal appropriations for homeland security 
total roughly $55 billion. 
Less than a year after September 11th, the President of the United States released the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security which provides a framework for addressing the 
challenge of protecting the country while using limited resources efficiently and maintaining a 
free and open society. The National Strategy developed six major mission areas to direct 
homeland security activities. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of homeland security funding across 
these major mission areas. In the years since September 11th, the majority of homeland security 
funding has gone towards border and transportation security, which includes initiatives such as 
airport screening, security at the nation’s ports, and screening of international visitors. Relatively 
less money has been spent on emergency preparedness and response efforts; however, a large 
percentage of this money is funneled to state and local governments in the form of grants.  
 
                    Figure 1: U.S. Homeland Security Spending by Department2  
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                 Figure 2: U.S. Homeland Security Spending by Mission Area3 
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Direct Federal Provision of Homeland Security 
 In many cases the federal government has opted to manage the provision of security 
services itself, rather than collaborating with state and local governments. In some cases, the 
government finances and provides security services using its own agencies, while in others the 
government pays a third party to engage in the security-enhancing activities. There are also 
instances where the government provides the service, but finances some or all of it using private 
sector funds, as is the case with user fees.  
 Table 1 provides a list of the six homeland security mission areas and which agencies in 
the federal bureaucracy are participating in the provision of these services. The sections below 
detail two of the programs that the government has initiated or expanded to increase the United 
States’ security and the costs involved in those programs.  
Border and Transportation Security: U.S. VISIT 
The United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology (U.S. VISIT) is a 
program designed to enhance security for United States citizens and visitors to the U.S. while 
promoting legitimate travel across America’s borders. U.S. VISIT applies to individuals holding 
non-immigrant visas traveling to and from the United States. The program involves the 
collection of biometric information (digital finger prints scans and a digital photograph) from 
visa applicants before the visa is processed by members of the Bureau of Consular Affairs within 
the Department of State (DOS). When the visa holder arrives in the U.S. an inkless digital finger 
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      Table 1: Provision of Homeland Security Services by the U.S. Government for Fiscal for FY 20074 
Mission Area Mission Federal Agencies Providing Services 
Intelligence Community 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis  
Federal Bureau of Investigations 
Intelligence and 
Warning 
Intelligence collection, 
analysis and distribution 
National Counterterrorism Center 
Customs and Border Protection  
Transportation Security Administration 
U.S. Coast Guard 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Border and 
Transportation Security 
Protect border and 
transportation systems 
including ports of entry 
Bureau of Consular Affairs 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism 
Identify, thwart and 
prosecute terrorists in 
the United States 
Federal Bureau of Investigations 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
U.S. Military 
National Cyber Security Division 
Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key 
Assets 
Secure nation's critical 
infrastructure and key 
assets Food and Drug Administration  
National Institutes of Health  
Directorate of Science and Technology 
U.S. Northern Command 
Defending Against 
Catastrophic Threats 
Detect and counter 
threat of chemical, 
biological, radiological, 
and nuclear weapons Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Nuclear Emergency Support Team 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response 
Prepare for and 
minimize the damage 
from major incidents 
and disasters Department of Health and Human Services 
 
scanner is used to capture scans of the individual’s finger prints and another digital picture is 
taken. This information is verified with the individual’s travel documents and checked against 
the Terrorism Watch List. Assuming verification of documents and satisfactory answers to 
biographic questions, the individual is allowed to enter the country. Originally, the U.S. VISIT 
program entry procedures collected digital scans from the visitor’s two index fingers; however, 
beginning in November 2007, the DHS began collecting scans from all ten fingers at some U.S. 
airports5.  
Initially, exit procedures were tested at selected airports and required the visitor to use an 
exit kiosk, which scanned the visa, the individual’s fingerprints and takes a digital photo. This 
information was verified and the individual was issued an exit receipt. While the intention of the 
program was that most foreign visitors would be required to check out before leaving the U.S., 
evidence from the pilot program revealed low traveler compliance. Therefore, on May 6, 2007, 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “US-VISIT: How It Works,” July 26, 2008, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/editorial_0525.shtm. 
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the DHS suspended the exit kiosk pilot program and is now exploring integrating biometric exit 
procedures into the existing international visitor departure process6.  
While the U.S.VISIT program is intended to increase security and allow better 
monitoring of non-immigrants while they are traveling in the U.S., it also imposes a variety of 
costs. These costs include the costs of equipping all ports of entry with the necessary technology; 
creating a secure database; personnel costs; and the effects of fewer non-immigrants coming to 
the U.S., either as tourists or as students. In order for the U.S. VISIT program to function as 
intended each entry and exit port will need to be equipped with the appropriate numbers of 
digital cameras, fingerprint scanners, and other necessary supplies. Additionally, costs attributed 
to the design, development, and maintenance of a secure database that is capable of interacting 
with many government agencies will be included in the initial costs of the program. Finally, to 
ensure proper functioning of the program, the DOS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Agency within the DHS will need additional staff to review documentation during visa issuance, 
populate the database with necessary information, and to process individuals entering and exiting 
the United States. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-
90) allocates $340 million for the development of the U.S. VISIT program7.  
 The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request included $60 million for the DHS to 
increase the number of digital finger prints collected from two to ten and for improved 
interoperability with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS); $71 million for the FBI to upgrade IAFIS and $10 
million for the DOS to initiate the implementation of the new security measures8.  
Border and Transportation Security: Screening at U.S. Airports 
 In an effort to address the public fear of flying resulting from the September 11th attacks, 
just two months later, the U.S. Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 
2001 (ATSA). This act created the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) and 
federalized the workforce that conducts passenger and baggage screening in the nation’s airports. 
However, section 108 of the ATSA also required the TSA to establish pilot programs at not more 
than five airports where private companies under federal oversight could conduct screening 
operations. Since November 19, 2004 all airports have been allowed to apply to the TSA to allow 
the airport to contract out for security services, but currently, only eleven airports are operating 
under contract, while the rest of the country has maintained the use of federal screeners9.  
 Although not as common as some of the other tools, user fees have been assessed to help 
finance the costs of additional airline security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
assesses passengers a fee of $2.50 - $5.00 per one-way ticket originating in the United States. 
This fee, known as the September 11th Security Fee requires airline passengers to share the cost 
of additional security without burdening citizens who refrain from air travel. Based on fee 
collections beginning on February 1, 2002 it is estimated that fees collected at the statutory 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “US-VISIT Moves Out of Biometric Exit Pilot Phase,” July 26, 2008, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1178549052332.shtm. 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90. 119 STAT. 2066. 
8 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Analytic Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 24. 
9 Transportation and Security Administration, “Screening Partnership Program: Frequently Asked Questions – 
Program,” July 26, 2008, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/optout/spp_faqs.shtm. 
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maximum would raise less than $1 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. The yield would be slightly larger 
in future fiscal years, but would still not cover all of TSA’s costs for airport security screening10. 
These costs include, among other things: 1) the salary, benefits and overtime of screening 
personnel, managers, and federal law enforcement personnel stationed at airport screening 
locations; 2) the costs of training the above personnel and purchasing, operating and maintaining 
the equipment used by personnel; 3) the costs of the Federal Air Marshals program; and, 4) the 
costs of performing background investigations on personnel11.  
 Recognizing that the September 11th Security Fee will not cover the TSA’s screening 
costs, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act allows the TSA to impose a fee on domestic 
and foreign air carriers to cover the shortfall. According to the ATSA, the amount of the fee 
charged each year by the TSA may not exceed the aggregate amount that air carriers paid for 
screening passengers and their baggage in calendar year 2000. For the months up to and 
including September 2004, each air carrier must pay 8.333 percent of the total amount of their 
costs for screening passengers and property in calendar year 200012. According to an April 2005 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, these fees are not recouping enough of 
the TSA’s costs of providing aviation security. The TSA’s Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations for 
airport screening activities were $3.1 billion. However, the TSA only collected about $1.8 billion 
for passenger security fees and $319 million in airline security fees, resulting in the government 
funding nearly $1.6 billion out of general revenues. GAO has recommended that the TSA 
consider these estimates in their study in determining the limitation on the aggregate air carrier 
fees13. 
Issues and Challenges in Direct Provision of Homeland Security 
Leman discusses some of the issues and challenges that can arise in the direct provision 
of government services14. He notes that historically direct government provision has tended to be 
inefficient when compared with alternative financing strategies, but that reforms undertaken 
during the 1990’s have started to change this situation. Leman likens direct provision to “The 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” noting that bureaucracies are very difficult to disband and that excessive 
devotion to the mission can cause “the tool [to] become an end in itself”15. Actions taken since 
September 11th have created a new bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security, which 
will likely create and retain its own constituency. While the need for increased security is 
currently high, if the Department retains its programs and funding during less secure times, 
Leman’s concerns may prove highly perceptive regarding the direct provision of government 
services.  
 
 
                                                 
10 "Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees and Assumption of Civil Aviation Security Functions and Responsibilities; 
Interim Final Rule and Notice," Federal Register 67:34 (February 20, 2002), p. 7927. 
11 Ibid, p. 7926-7927. 
12 “Notice of Resumption of the September 11th Security Fee and the Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee Following 
Temporary Suspension,” Federal Registrar 68:188 (September 29, 2003), p. 55985. 
13 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Fees: Review of Air Carriers’ Year 2000 Passenger and Property 
Screening Costs (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005). 
14 Leman, Christopher, “Direct Government” In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited 
by Lester M. Salamon, p. 48-79 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
15 Ibid, p. 74. 
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Grants to Secure the Nation’s Homeland 
Since September 11th, federal, state, and local governments have taken steps to prevent 
and prepare for the next terrorist attack. It is generally accepted that state and local public safety 
personnel - law enforcement, fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and hospitals - will be 
the first to respond to a terrorist attack. These organizations, along with private security firms, 
are on the front lines for protecting America’s homeland. Therefore, the federal government has 
provided funding to enhance the capabilities of these state, local, and private organizations 
through a variety of grant programs. The federal government is willing to subsidize expenditures 
for prevention and preparedness to encourage an integrated approach, bringing resources from all 
levels of government. As evident by the response to Hurricane Katrina, preparedness failures 
affect people across many jurisdictions creating a need for federal aid to compensate for this 
potential externality. However, the intent of the federal government is for these grants to be a 
short-term investment in capital and to build response capabilities16. Between 2001 and 2007, the 
DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have allocated $16 billion in grants to fund state and local preparedness efforts17. Table 2 
provides funding information for many of the emergency preparedness grants offered from the 
DHS and other executive branch departments. 
The Fiscal Year 2006 grant cycle is the first in which the Interim National Preparedness 
Goal has been in place to outline America’s national priorities and to concentrate expenditures 
on enhancing capabilities. This common planning structure allows the nation to define targeted 
levels of performance and measure progress towards these goals18. The Interim National 
Preparedness Goal, along with the National Response Plan, published in December 2004, 
provided state and local grant recipients the guidance they have sought since the first round of 
homeland security grants were appropriated19. Prior to the release of these documents, there was 
no clear strategic guidance from the federal level about terrorism preparedness objectives, and 
many grant recipients report that they were unsure how to best spend the grant dollars they 
received which caused miscommunication between state and local governments about what 
capabilities needed to be funded20.  
Grants Offered through the Department of Homeland Security 
 The U.S. government provided financial assistance for terrorism preparedness prior to 
September 11th, in fact, the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) was established in 1998 to 
help state and local officials enhance their ability to respond to chemical or biological terrorism. 
In Fiscal Year 1999, the ODP provided a total of $85.5 million in grant monies to all fifty states, 
and 157 of the nation’s most populated cities and counties21. After September 11th, the amount of 
                                                 
16 Gramlich, John, “Anti-Terror Funds to States are Shrinking”, Stateline.org, July 19, 2007. 
17 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Analytic Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007) p. 30. 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007) p. 1. 
19  In September 2007 the National Preparedness Goal was re-released and renamed the National Response 
Guidelines. Likewise, in January 2008 the DHS replaced the National Response Plan with the National Response 
Framework.  
20 “An Analysis of First Responder Grant Funding,” (Washington, DC: House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, 2004). 
21 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Program Information,” November 19, 2005, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_programs.htm. 
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money flowing to the states increased dramatically. In Fiscal Year 2004, over $3.7 billion was 
awarded across the many grant programs provided by the ODP22. 
 The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSPG) consolidates five grant programs from 
previous years and is perhaps the single largest grant program available for emergency 
preparedness activities. It provides funding for organization, planning, training, exercises, 
equipment, and management and administration to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from hazards including terrorist attacks and major disasters23. The Fiscal Year 2006 
grant program is the first real push to begin allocating federal money to the states based on risk 
and need in an effort to create a high return on investment24. Base allocations are still available 
to states under the State Homeland Security Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program, with the remainder of those funds allocated based on risk. However, the 
Urban Area Security Initiative grants are awarded based solely on risk and need. The 
Metropolitan Medical Response System and the Citizen Corps Program remain allocated based 
on the Fiscal Year 2005 formula25. Other grant programs managed by the DHS focus on securing 
critical infrastructure like transit systems and ports. Some of these programs allocate funds based 
on a formula, and others are allocated based on risk or need. 
 The HSGP, along with many other grants managed by the DHS require the State 
Administrative Agency to apply for and coordinate the grant monies provided by the federal 
government. States must then obligate or pass through 80% of the funds they receive under 
formula grants for use by localities. Although Fiscal Year 2006 is the first year that the federal 
government has allocated grants based on risk and need, some states report having incorporated 
some threat, risk, or vulnerability factors into their funding formulas for their Fiscal Year 2003 
allocations26. According to a report completed by the Staff of the House Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, 22 states allocated grant money to their local governments based on some 
consideration of risk or threat, and 25 states made allocations based on some consideration of 
achieving capabilities or fulfilling needs27. 
Grants Offered Outside of the Department of Homeland Security 
 Management of some aspects of preparedness remains outside of the DHS, since the 
grants are better administered in the department most familiar with the specific area of expertise. 
The HHS makes grants available from/to hospitals and healthcare systems to provide care to 
victims of terrorism or other public health emergencies. These tasks include increasing surge 
capacity, decontamination capacity and isolation capacity. Additional grants provide support to 
health care educational facilities to prepare a workforce of healthcare professionals to address 
emergency preparedness and response issues28. In an effort to coordinate the management of 
these funding streams with those offered by the DHS, a Federal Preparedness Grant Program  
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005) p. ii. 
24 Ibid, p. 1. 
25 Ibid, p. 52. 
26 “An Analysis of First Responder Grant Funding,” (Washington, DC: House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, 2004). 
27 Ibid. 
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005) 17-18. 
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Table 2: Funds Obligated by the U.S. Government to Preparedness Grant Programs29 (in millions of dollars) 
Program FY2006  FY 2005 FY 2004  
Urban Area Security Initiative 734.6 854.7 671.11 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program 400.02 386.3 497.1 
State Homeland Security Program 544.0 1,062.3 1,669.4 
Citizen Corps Program 19.8 13.5 39.8 
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program 29.7 22.3 50.0 
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program 170.0 178.9 178.3 
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 524.4 633.5 684.33 
Buffer Zone Protection Program 50.0 92.0 0.04 
Transit Security Grant Program/Intercity Passenger Rail 
Security Grant Program 148.5 150.0 49.0
1 
Port Security Grant Program 173.0 150.0 179.0 
Intercity Bus Security Grant Program 10.0 10.0 10.0 
National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program 458.0 466.0 497.0 
Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum Development Program 26.0 26.0 26.6 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative 
Agreement n/a 862.8
5 849.65 
FEMA Pre-disaster Mitigation Grants n/a 282.6 212.0 
FEMA Flood Mitigation Grants 28.0 20.0 n/a 
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants n/a 184.5 n/a 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program 416.56 634.06 474.9 
Homeland Security Agricultural Grant 28.8 8.6 7.6 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Grant Program n/a n/a 12.87 
1 The CFDA does not provide FY 2004 data for these two programs. According to the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Grants 
and Training, the FY 2004 Urban Areas Security Imitative funds included $671 million to enhance the security of key urban areas and $49 
million to protect critical mass transit systems with heavy rail and commuter rail components. 
2 The CFDA estimate for the FY 2006 obligation for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program was not yet available. The 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109 - 90) appropriated $400.0 million to this grant program.  
3 CFDA does not provide FY 2004 data for this program. However, the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program's website reports that $684.3 
million was allocated in FY 2004. 
4 The Buffer Zone Protection Program was initiated in FY 2005. 
5 The CFDA does not provide information regarding the current Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement. The Center 
for Disease Control's website reports that $849.6 and $862.8 million were allocated to this program in FY 2004 and FY 2005 respectively. 
6 The CFDA estimate for the FY 2005 and FY 2006 obligation for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program were not yet 
available. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447) and the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109 - 108) appropriated $634.0 and $416.5 million, respectively to this grant program.  
7 Information regarding the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Grant Program was not located within the CFDA database. 
However, the grant program's website reported that $12.8 million was allocated in FY 2004. 
                                                 
29 Data compiled using the Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) website. Retrieved April 18, 2006, 
from http://12.46.245.173/cfda/cfda.html. 
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Steering Committee was formed by DHS and HHS to strengthen each agencies respective grant 
programs while maintaining the focus of each program30. Preparedness grants are also offered 
through the DOJ, the Department of Agriculture (DOA), and the Department of Transportation 
(DOT). Most of these grants are allocated based on formulas; however, the Fiscal Year 2005 
program guidance for both the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program and the 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement report that they envision the 
Fiscal Year 2006 allocations to be based on risk31,32.  
Structure of Grants to Secure the Nation’s Homeland 
 Overall, the form of and requirements for these federal grants vary considerably. Table 3 
provides detailed information on this variety for each of the analyzed grant programs during 
Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006. Most of the grants are block grants allowing states flexibility in the 
types of programs it supports. However, the grants are often categorical and have narrowly 
defined purposes. In the Program Guidance for the HSGP, the DHS specifies a set of allowable 
costs for many of the grant programs including some administered outside of the DHS. Matching 
requirements also vary by grant program. In the majority of cases, matching is not required; 
however, some grant programs like the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program 
and the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program require the grantee to match the funds provided 
by the federal government. Almost all of the grant programs examined mandate that federal 
funds only supplement existing funds rather than replace them. Some programs require a 
certification to this extent a few like the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Grant Program require that grantees maintain 
spending levels at a rate at least equal to an average of the prior two years spending.  
One issue that has been raised about the federal homeland security grants is whether 
funds are allocated on the basis of terrorism risk. In a study done by the RAND Center for 
Terrorism Risk Management Policy, Willis, Morral, Kelly, and Medby estimate the risk factors 
associated with the urban areas that received Urban Area Security Initiative funding in Fiscal 
Year 2004 and compared the shares of funding with the shares of risk each city faced. The 
authors find that risk shares vary much more widely than funding shares, suggesting that if risk is 
to be the basis for grant allocation, some urban areas are under-funded, while others may be 
over-funded33. Although it is possible that these results reflect the fact that aggregated estimates 
of risk-shares have a wider variance than shares based on both population or density-weighted 
population, the authors note that these results suggest that even the small portion of grants that 
are said to be allocated on the basis of risk in 2004, may be only marginally so, and that 
considerations other than risk determined funding allocations. Since the U.S. is a democracy 
funding patterns that correspond to electoral advantage as opposed to risk may be inevitable, but 
this finding suggests a need to account for political structure when evaluating homeland security 
funding. 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 21.  
31 U.S. Health Resources and Service Administration, National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program: 
Fiscal Year 2005 Continuation Guidance (Washington DC: U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration, 
2005).  
32 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness: Program Announcement AA154 (Washington, DC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2005). 
33 Willis, Henry H., Andrew R. Morral, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jamison Jo Meadby. Estimating Terrorism Risk 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005) p. 62. 
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Table 3: Grant Structures of Emergency Preparedness Grants during Fiscal Years 2005 and 200634 
Program Eligibility Funds Awarded Matching Requirements 
Maintenance of 
Effort 
Urban Area Security Initiative Designated urban areas Risk and need No match Non-supplanting certification 
Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program States, DC and territories 
Base allocation, then 
risk and need No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
State Homeland Security 
Program States, DC and territories 
Base allocation, then 
risk and need No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Citizen Corps Program States, DC and territories Formula No match Non-supplanting certification 
Metropolitan Medical Response 
System Program (MMRSP) 
 Designated MMRSP 
jurisdictions Formula No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Emergency Management 
Performance Grant Program States, DC and territories Formula Matching = 50% 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Assistance to Firefighters Grant 
Program 
Fire Departments & non-
affiliated EMS working in 
states and territories 
Competitive with 
demographic 
restrictions  
Matching = 
percentage based 
on population 
served 
Maintain operating 
expenditures at level 
equal to average over 
last two years 
Buffer Zone Protection Program 
Designated critical 
infrastructure/key resource 
sites (State must apply) 
Base allocation, then 
risk and need No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Transit Security Grant Program Designated transit systems (States must apply) 
Formula - risk 
assessment required 
in grant application 
No match Non-supplanting certification 
Port Security Grant Program Eligible ports Risk  
Matching = 50% 
for private sector 
only 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Intercity Bus Security Grant 
Program 
Owners/operators of fixed 
route, intercity bus services Competitive No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
Intercity Passenger Rail 
Security Grant Program 
Amtrak is the only eligible 
grantee for FY 2005 
Funding directly to 
Amtrak No match 
Non-supplanting 
certification 
National Bioterrorism Hospital 
Preparedness Program 
States, DC and territories 
along with three largest 
municipalities 
Formula, but 
beginning in FY 06 
program envisioned to 
include risk 
No match Not specified 
Bioterrorism Training and 
Curriculum Development 
Program 
Nonprofit accredited health 
professions schools and other 
educational entities 
Competitive No match Not specified 
Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative 
Agreement 
States, DC and territories 
Formula, but 
beginning in FY 06 
program envisioned to 
include risk 
No match 
Non-supplanting 
statement in guidance, 
no certification 
required 
FEMA Mitigation Grants States, DC and territories Competitive Matching = 25% Not specified 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Program States, DC and territories Formula Matching = 25% 
Non-supplanting 
statement in guidance, 
no certification 
required 
Homeland Security Agricultural 
Grant Program 
Any entity that may further 
research or educational in food 
and agricultural sciences 
Competitive No match Not specified 
Hazardous Materials 
Emergency Preparedness Grant 
Program 
States, DC and territories Formula Matching = 20% 
Maintain operating 
expenditures at level 
equal to average over 
last two years 
 
                                                 
34 The data on the structure of the grants was compiled from program guidance and application kits, the Catalogue of 
Federal Domestic Assistance and documentation from the program's website. 
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Despite RAND’s findings, according to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), since Fiscal Year 2006, over half of the homeland security grant funding is based on risk 
and need35. The DHS determined a formula for the FY 2006 HSGP grants that contains two 
complementary risk calculations. Asset-based risk focuses on the assets within a jurisdiction that 
might be susceptible to a terrorist attack. For example, nuclear power plants, theme parks, mass 
transit systems, and national monuments and icons are some of the assets that increase a 
jurisdiction’s risk of terrorist attack. Geographically-based risk ascribes risk to jurisdictions 
based on unique characteristics that are not attributable to a specific asset. Jurisdictions with 
military bases or high population density are examples of places with high geographically-based 
risk. Likewise, need is determined based on a state’s Program and Capability Enhancement Plan 
and its’ Investment Justifications which are required parts of the grant application process36.  
Another issue is the classic public finance question of whether intergovernmental grants 
actually stimulate greater spending on the designated activity by the recipient. There is limited 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of these grant programs and their impact on state and local 
spending on preparedness. In 2004 the National Association of Counties released survey results 
that indicated that as a result of intergovernmental funding and planning, 75 percent of surveyed 
counties felt they were better prepared to respond to the terrorist threat. While the survey found 
that 40 percent of the counties had appropriated their own funds to assist with homeland security, 
it also showed that 54 percent of the counties had not used any of their own funds to increase 
homeland security37. Because shared fiscal responsibility is an important condition of successful 
federalism, research should look into whether federal funds have stimulated or displaced state 
and local level efforts at securing the United States. 
Issues and Challenges in Using Intergovernmental Grants 
Beam and Conlan note that grants in general are prone to “goal displacement,” 
duplication of efforts, and “leakages of funds”38. Because grants require recipients to execute the 
policy, the goals of the donor government must, to some extent, be supplanted by recipient 
governments. In addition, because recipient governments have multiple funding sources, it is 
possible for them to use the grant moneys to displace current spending and use their previous 
funding sources for purposes other than those for which the grants were originally intended. 
When multiple grants are aimed at achieving the same objective, such displacement may be 
easier and will also result in decreased efficiency with respect to achieving social objectives. In 
the case of grants for homeland security, Table 2 indicates the number of different programs 
aimed at achieving the similar objectives, while Table 3 shows that most grant programs have 
relatively few controls to ensure that granted moneys are used to augment and not replace state 
and local spending. Thus, the current grant structures may be achieving relatively small increases 
in funding for homeland security at a relatively high price. 
 
                                                 
35 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: Department 
of Homeland Security” March 2, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/dhs.html. 
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005) p. 53. 
37 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Analytic Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007) p. 30. 
38 Beam, David R., and Timothy J. Conlan. “Grants” In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, 
edited by Lester M. Salamon, p. 340-380. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 371-372.  
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Regulation and Homeland Security 
In addition to the budgetary tools described in the previous sections, the federal 
government can also make use of its regulatory powers to require actors in the private sector to 
take certain actions that are designed to enhance security. Table 4 lists the critical infrastructures 
(as defined in the “National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets”) and the organizations that are responsible for regulation. This table illustrates the 
myriad of actors involved in regulating private behaviors in the U.S. 
Estimating the cost of mandating increased homeland security by means of government 
regulation is difficult because much of the nation’s critical infrastructure has been regulated 
since long before September 11th. Thus, the cost of using government regulation to increase 
homeland security is the added regulatory cost associated with tightening and/or augmenting 
existing regulations in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. 
Table 4 indicates the breadth of areas of homeland security governed by regulations and 
the large number of public and private regulatory bodies involved in the regulatory process, all of 
which create a highly complex system. Because it is difficult to obtain information about the 
effects and costs of all the regulations summarized in Table 4, the case of nuclear power is 
examined as an example. 
Nuclear Power Plant Regulation: What and How Much? 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established in 1974 and has primary 
jurisdiction over the regulation of nuclear power plants. Even prior to September 11th the 
potential costs resulting from a nuclear accident were seen to be sufficiently large to warrant 
government regulation. Although the risk of such an accident is quite small, the costs to society 
are high enough that reliance on the market alone may generate insufficient levels of security, 
especially due to the high negative externalities associated with a nuclear meltdown. According 
to a 1982 report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the NRC, the probability of a 
severe accidental release may be in the range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000 but could result in 
the deaths of over 100,000 people, injuries to over 100,000 people, and costs exceeding $100 - 
300 billion39. After September 11th, the probability of such a nuclear event occurring has 
increased due to the possibility of terrorist attacks.  
 Nuclear regulations are extremely complex and numerous. The following paragraphs 
describe some of the major types of nuclear power plant regulations enforced by the NRC. For 
each type of reactor, the NRC publishes Standard Technical Specifications (STS) that plants are 
required to comply with, such as concrete structures to protect reactor cores. Specifications are 
continuously being updated and plants are encouraged to upgrade their technology accordingly40. 
In addition to the STS’s, plants are required to be equipped with several safety systems such as 
emergency core cooling systems41 and the NRC regulates the power level at which each plant 
can operate42. 
 
                                                 
39 Sandia. Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development. (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National 
Laboratories, 1982). 
40 NRC. Technical Specifications. (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006). 
41 NRC. PWR Sump Performance. (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006). 
42 NRC. Power Updates. (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006). 
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    Table 4: Critical Infrastructures and Regulatory Bodies43 
Infrastructure Regulatory Bodies 
Agriculture and Food DHS, HHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) 
Water DHS, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state and local governments, 
water ISAC*  
Public Health DHS, HHS, state and local governments, private health facilities 
Emergency Services DHS, DOJ, state and local governments 
Defense Industrial Base DHS, DOD 
Telecommunications DHS, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), President’s National Security 
Advisory Committee and Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, 
Government Network Security Information Exchanges, telecommunications 
ISAC 
Energy DHS, DOE, North American Electric Reliability Council, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, state and local 
governments, electricity ISAC 
Transportation DHS, DOT, state and local governments, surface transportation ISAC, port 
authorities, Coast Guard, Customs, local transit authorities 
Banking and Finance DHS, Treasury, Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Federal Banking Information Infrastructure Committee, state governments, 
financial services ISAC 
Chemical Industry and 
Hazardous Materials 
DHS, EPA, state and local governments, private sector trade associations 
Postal and Shipping DHS, U.S Postal Service (USPS) 
*ISAC’s are Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, associations of organizations in the private sector 
 
 Licensees (the owners of nuclear power plants) are required to monitor their maintenance 
efforts to ensure that safety components are functioning, non-safety related activities will not 
impede safety procedures, and failures resulting in the need to engage in safety-related activities 
are minimized44. In addition to licensee activity, the NRC has its own Reactor Oversight Process 
that measures plant performance in the areas of reactor safety, radiation safety, and security. The 
NRC’s seven cornerstones for safety include initiating events, mitigating systems, barrier 
integrity, emergency preparedness, occupational radiation safety, public radiation safety, and 
physical protection45. Finally, the NRC establishes regulations for emergency plans and the types 
of threats operators must protect against and requires background checks of all operators46. 
Regulations are enforced through an oversight and licensing process. In addition to the regulation 
                                                 
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
44 NRC. Operating Reactor Maintenance Efforts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006).  
45 NRC. Multiple/ Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column. (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2006).  
46 CBO, Homeland Security and the Private Sector. (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2004). 
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of nuclear power plants, other regulations exist in the nuclear sector to address the long-term 
storage of spent fuel and the potential consequences of accidents, but those regulations are 
outside the scope of this discussion. 
 As is well-known from the case of other government regulations, although there are 
budgetary costs of adopting regulatory standards – overseeing private actors, and enforcing 
regulatory policies – these costs generally represent only a small portion of the total costs of 
regulation. The lion’s share of the costs generally falls on private individuals and firms who must 
bear the costs of complying with the regulations.  
 In the case of nuclear power plant regulation, the most obvious costs of these regulations 
are the costs of the NRC, which totaled $670 million in 2005. Of these, 10 percent or $67 million 
was funded through the budget, while the remaining $603 million was financed through fees and 
fines assessed to license holders and applicants. While these costs are initially born by the plant 
operators and investors, they are then passed on to electricity consumers through the rate base. 
Thus, the consumers of the power finance 90 percent of the costs of the NRC47. 
 In addition to the costs of the NRC, nuclear power regulations impose compliance costs 
on the private sector. One of the difficulties in measuring these costs is that in the case of nuclear 
power plants, distinguishing between an operating or maintenance cost and a safety-related cost 
is practically impossible. James Joosten at the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
suggests using two-thirds of the operating and maintenance costs as a rough estimate of the costs 
of compliance48. Because this represents a very rough estimate, the following numbers should be 
interpreted with some caution. 
 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) estimates that the average yearly operating and 
maintenance costs for 2004 were 1.26 cents/kWh and applying the two-thirds rule, this gives us 
0.84 cents/kWh for compliance with nuclear safety regulations49. In 2004, the NEI estimates that 
the U.S. produced 788.6 million MWh of nuclear energy50 which means the costs of security 
related-activities were approximately $6.62 billion, almost 10 times higher than the costs of the 
NRC, and almost 100 times higher than the costs born by taxpayers. As is the case with licensing 
and application fees, nuclear plants then pass this cost on to ratepayers in their electrical service 
areas.  What is significant about these costs is that they illustrate that regulatory costs are like an 
iceberg. The budgetary costs are like the exposed part of the iceberg, and represent only a tiny 
fraction of the true costs of the regulation; estimating the much larger hidden costs is almost 
impossible to do by examining the costs from the surface. Budgeting for regulation is thus, much 
more difficult than budgeting for direct expenditures or grants due to the environment of 
uncertainty. 
Incremental Cost of Regulatory Changes Enacted in Response to 9/11 
                                                 
47 J. Joosten, Energy Information Administration, personal communication, January 27, 2005. 
48 The rationale behind the two-thirds measure is that about 50% of plant components are related to the nuclear 
island, but the number needs to be adjusted upwards to reflect the fact that nuclear plant parts cost 3 to 10 times 
more money when used in a safety-related application (J. Joosten, Energy Information Administration, personal 
communication, January 27, 2005).  
49 NEI, “U.S. nuclear non-fuel operating and maintenance costs 1981 – 2004” March 5, 2006, 
http://www.nei.org/documents/U.S._Nuclear_Industry_Non-Fuel_OM_Costs.pdf.  
50 NEI. “Top ten nuclear generating countries 2004” March 5, 2006, 
http://www.nei.org/documents/top_10_nuclear_generating_countries.pdf. 
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 Although the NRC has been continuously updating regulations for some time, the NEI 
suggests that both public and private security measures have increased since September 11th. 
Among the changes are: an increase in the number of security personnel and the training they are 
required to have; a strengthening of plant perimeters, such as new protections against vehicle 
bombs; and additional surveillance equipment. The NEI estimates that these changes have cost 
$1.2 billion51, representing an increase in the costs of approximately 10 percent.  
Issues and Challenges in Government Regulation as a Policy Tool 
Governments often find regulation to be an attractive policy instrument, and a 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)52 report notes that there are a number of ways in which 
existing federal regulations could be modified to improve the security of the nation’s private 
infrastructure. Nonetheless, as May53 notes challenges abound in both the design and 
implementation of regulations, particularly when attempting to determine the socially optimal 
levels of risk and enforcement severity. May concludes that “regulations that address first-order, 
visible, and concentrated harms” are the easiest to manage, while indirect and diffuse harms are 
more difficult. In the case of nuclear regulation, the threat is highly diffuse and the uncertainty 
great, suggesting that identifying the socially optimal level of risk may not be possible. This 
difficulty is compounded in a world in which the threat of a terrorist attack is an additional risk 
factor; especially since unlike natural and physical hazards, threats involving human behavior 
can react in response to changes in regulatory policies aimed at lowering threats of attack. 
 
Providing Insurance  
Unlike some of the other policies discussed above, facilitating the provision of insurance 
does not protect homeland security by preventing an attack or mitigating the risks associated 
with one. Rather, it serves to prevent negative consequences arising from the fear of an attack by 
spreading the potential financial costs. Providing insurance to private parties enhances economic 
well-being by allowing private actors to mitigate the potentially devastating economic effects of 
individual catastrophic terrorist incidents. The ability to insure against the consequences of 
terrorist attacks is useful ex-ante because it helps individuals and business plan for the future, 
and ex-post because it spreads large concentrated losses among a broader population. A potential 
issue, however, is that, if insurance premiums are set lower than would be warranted based on 
true actuarial risks, by subsidizing risk, the government may move business activity into sectors 
and regions that have higher than average risks, and encourage more risk-taking than is socially 
desirable. Since the relationship between risk and business activity is highly endogenous 
(terrorists preferring more populated, thriving areas all else equal) assessing the extent of this 
second consequence is methodologically challenging. The most prominent use of insurance in 
response to the September 11th terrorist attacks is the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(TRIA). 
 
                                                 
51 NEI, Post-Sept. 11 Security Enhancements: More Personnel, Patrols, Equipment, Barriers. (Nuclear Energy 
Institute, 2006).  
52 CBO, Homeland Security and the Private Sector. (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2004). 
53 May, Peter, “Social Regulation” In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by Lester 
M. Salamon, p.156 - 186 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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TRIA: What and Why? 
 Insurance against terrorist attacks was provided in the private sector prior to September 
11th, and as a result of the attacks privately insured losses were $30 - $35 billion. Insurers total 
underwriting losses for 2001 reached $52.6 billion. Investment income proved inadequate to 
cover these losses, leading to a decrease in industry net worth of $27.8 billion54. These drastic 
losses resulted in a reluctance to continue to offer insurance in the private sector. The collapse of 
a private market for terrorism insurance provoked concerns about further economic 
consequences, such as excess risk to property owners, reduced economic activity, and a decline 
in commercial construction55. The concerns about commercial construction were particularly 
important because commercial mortgage-backed securities generally require terrorism insurance 
as a prerequisite for the loan or and in other cases may set the bond rating, in part on whether the 
entity has insurance56. Without terrorism insurance, loans become either unavailable or more 
expensive due to the increased interest rates that occur resulting from a lower bond rating, 
investment in commercial construction could be significantly reduced in the absence of a market 
for terrorism insurance. 
 As a response to these concerns, Congress enacted TRIA in 2002, which requires all 
commercial property and casualty insurers to offer terrorism coverage and established the federal 
government as the reinsurer. In the event of an attack, insurers would be required to pay a 
deductible, which in 2005 equaled 15 percent of its revenues from premiums for the previous 
year. Under TRIA, the deductibles rose annually, reaching 20 percent in 2007. After the 
deductible has been met, the federal government would pay 90 percent of additional losses up to 
$100 billion per year and the insurer would pay the remaining 10 percent, with the government’s 
contribution dropping to 85 percent in 200757. It is not clear what would happen if industry 
losses exceeded $100 billion, but the insurance companies would not be responsible for such 
losses. Currently, the government exacts no payments for its reinsurance, but in the event of an 
attack, it is required to recoup some of its money from annual surcharges assessed on insurers 
and policy holders. The amount they are required to recoup (known as the aggregate industry 
retention level) was $15 billion in 2005, but it increases annually, rising to $25 billion in 2006 
and $27.5 billion in 2007. Surcharges would be limited to 3 percent of each insurers’ aggregate 
premiums on property and casualty or group life insurance, but can be charged for as long as is 
necessary to recover the necessary retention level. The CBO estimates that the surcharges will 
total $1.6 billion, but that not all of these revenues will be collected during the 2006 -2015 time 
period58. 
 The TRIA legislation was intended to foster the development of a private insurance 
market, not to make the government the final reinsurer. The purpose of requiring all insurers to 
offer coverage and the increasing deductibles and industry retention levels is to pass more of the 
risk onto the private market, hoping that this will foster its development independent of the 
                                                 
54 CBO, Federal Terrorism and Reinsurance Act: An Update. (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 
2005), p. 3. 
55 CBO, Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005. (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2005). 
56 Ibid, p. 10. 
57CBO, Cost Estimate for S. 476: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2005. (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget 
Office, 2006), p.2. 
58 Ibid. 
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federal government’s involvement59. Because the goal was to revive the previously existing 
insurance market and not to expand coverage, several types of terrorism are excluded from TRIA 
coverage. Acts of war and domestic terrorism are not covered, and most insurers do not cover 
losses from nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological attacks. TRIA expired on December 
31, 2005 and the U.S. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, 
extending TRIA until 2007. The extension of TRIA, S. 467 sets a minimum amount of damages 
necessary to qualify of $50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 200760. In December 2007, 
TRIA received a further renewal through calendar year 2014 and requiring insurers to cover 
domestic terrorism attacks61.  
The Costs of TRIA: Who Pays and How Much? 
 Estimating the costs of TRIA is very difficult because the probability, expected 
magnitude, and timing of an attack are all unknowns. Because there were no terrorist attacks 
under the original TRIA, the only budgetary costs are administrative expenses. For the 2005 
extension, the president’s budget only included the administrative costs, which were $4 million 
in 2005 and $6 million in 200662. The CBO’s estimates that between 2006 and 2010 the 
extension of TRIA will increase spending by $1.4 billion and revenues by $150 million; and over 
the next 10 years will increase spending by $1.5 billion and revenues by $720 million63. The 
2007 extension is expected to increase direct spending by $6.6 billion from 2008 until 2017, but 
to receive offsetting revenues of $6.6 billion, making it revenue neutral. The increase in 
projected costs arises from the inclusion of domestic terrorism under TRIA, while increasing 
revenues reflect the higher assessments imposed on insurers64 TRIA also includes some 
intergovernmental mandates, which are expected to cost a total of $62 million and private-sector 
mandates, which are expected to cost $123 million. Costs to the state governments include the 
adoption of guidelines for reserves and premium costs. TRIA also preempts certain state laws 
that regulate insurance. Costs to the private sector result from the requirement to offer coverage, 
the associated deductible, along with, any future assessments and surcharges65.  
 As in the case of regulation, however, it is important to note that budgetary outlays are 
likely to understate the true cost of a program such as TRIA because the budgetary estimates 
presented above do not include any charge for the risk and uncertainty borne by taxpayers. Thus, 
the budgetary estimates are less than the economic cost of such reinsurance. As noted by the 
CBO, the consequences of extending TRIA would be to expose taxpayers to tens of billions of 
potential liabilities (which might or might not materialize) for an additional two years.  
Because of the uncertainty of the actual costs of an attack (or even the probability of an 
attack) the preceding numbers must be taken as very rough estimates at best. However, it is 
possible to identify some of the effects of TRIA in shifting financial responsibility between 
sectors. First, by requiring insurance to be offered, TRIA shifts risk from property owners to the 
insurers and then, the reinsurance policy further shifts risks onto taxpayers. Even if the aggregate 
                                                 
59 CBO, Federal Terrorism Reinsurance, p. 2. 
60 CBO, Cost Estimate for S. 476. 
61 CBO, Cost Estimate for H.R. 2761: Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act. (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Budget Office, 2008). 
62 OMB, FY 2006 Budget, p. 919. 
63 CBO, Cost Estimate for S. 476. 
64 CBO, Cost Estimate for H.R. 2761. 
65 CBO, Federal Terrorism Reinsurance. 
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industry retention rate is high enough for the government to recoup all of their costs, TRIA 
represents an inter-temporal transfer from the private sector to the public sector. This shifting of 
risk in effect subsidizes the insurance costs to property owners and may impose costs on society 
as a whole in deterring risk retention efforts.  
In addition to imposing social costs in the form of deferred risk abatement, Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan argue that the permanent extension of TRIA could induce insurers to increase 
their TRIA coverage, which would shift risk to all commercial insurance owners in the event of 
an attack. More specifically, because the costs of an attack are currently born by tax payers and 
then recouped from all insurers (regardless of whether they experience an attack), TRIA highly 
subsidizes the costs of an attack while insurers still keep the premium revenue, providing an 
incentive for excess provision of insurance66. Due to the structure of the deductible/ risk sharing 
policy, insurers also have the incentive to insure geographically concentrated buildings in high 
risk areas, since they realize that a terrorist attack is likely to damage not only a single building, 
but also those surrounding them67. The combined result of excess insurance provided in 
geographically concentrated areas would be a shifting of financial responsibility from the private 
to the public sector and a continued absence of adequate risk abatement in the private sector. 
While TRIA was not intended to become permanent, if it ends up being extended indefinitely, it 
is likely to exacerbate current market distortions. 
Issues and Challenges in Providing Government Sponsored Insurance 
Feldman notes that insurance in general is likely to exacerbate moral hazard problems by 
removing financial responsibility from the private sector68and that it generally only achieves cost 
savings when it supplants, rather than supplements, disaster relief69. Both of these concerns are 
relevant in the case of TRIA. As noted earlier, risk deterrence is reduced by the presence of 
insurance and instead of locating in safer areas companies may continue to concentrate 
themselves geographically, creating attractive targets for terrorists. While insurers are required to 
offer insurance, companies and individuals are not required to purchase it, suggesting that in the 
event of an attack, the government would probably be spending money for reinsurance and 
disaster relief simultaneously. In addition, if the attack were particularly severe, disaster relief 
efforts may be required to address damages exceeding the $100 billion limit under TRIA, further 
suggesting that TRIA imposes both accounting and efficiency costs on society. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The public sector has always assumed responsibility for providing homeland security in 
addition to national defense and police protection, which are inherently governmental functions.  
However, in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the public sector role has expanded 
considerably in the United States. This paper has discussed three broad areas of federal response: 
budgetary outlays for direct federal spending and for government grants to state and local 
                                                 
66 Krunther & Kerjan, Looking Beyond TRIA: A Clinical Examination of Potential Terrorism Loss Sharing. 
(Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006), p. 28. 
67 Ibid, p. 23. 
68 Feldman,  Ron. “Government Insurance” In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by 
Lester M. Salamon, p. 186-216 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 207. 
69 Ibid, p. 212. 
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governments; modifications of existing federal regulatory programs; and, subsidization of anti-
terrorism insurance. While this paper has focused on the use of these tools in the U.S. approach 
to homeland security, spending money, regulation, and insurance are policy tools available to all 
governments in a variety of policy areas. Understanding their economic effects and costs is 
important to both government officials and academics alike. 
 From a public economics standpoint, an overarching policy objective should be to ensure 
that scarce public funds and resources generally are well-spent. However, as we have noted, 
homeland security is no different from any other government policy in that issues and challenges 
arise in their use and implementation. 
 As a concluding note, we point to three challenges which we believe to be of special 
importance. One is to develop means of evaluating the performance both of budgetary and non-
budgetary tools in the area of homeland security. On one hand, as a new and emerging policy 
area, the evaluation of government spending and regulatory policies intended to increase 
homeland security is able to draw upon an extensive body of prior work on performance 
evaluation, and regulatory impact and cost-benefit analysis in the federal government. On the 
other hand, evaluating whether dollars on homeland security programs are well-spent requires 
addressing new and complex issues of risk analysis. Dealing with terrorism risk, unlike dealing 
with risks from natural hazards, or toxic chemicals, involves playing games against human 
actors, whose behavior can change in response to government policies, thereby changing threat 
probabilities. For example, businesses and people are attracted to thriving urban areas, which 
then make these areas a greater target for terrorists. Providing insurance can prevent the 
economic losses that occur with urban decline and population sprawl if the threat of terrorism is 
an impediment to economic development. However, in removing the market incentives that risk 
creates, government may be promoting a concentration of economic activity in risky locations, 
raising overall costs to society. 
 An additional area for future research involves the effectiveness of federal grants to state 
and local governments. By its very nature, the provision of homeland security must involve close 
collaboration between the national and state and local governments, and intergovernmental 
grants have long been used as a mechanism for financing public goods that are both national and 
local in character. As we have documented, the federal government provides multiple grants in 
aid to state and/or local governments to encourage greater spending at the local level for 
homeland security. As has been the case in other grant programs, the jury is still out as to 
whether these grant programs, which are largely structured as non-matching grants, will actually 
increase spending for homeland security at the state and local levels, or whether despite 
“maintenance of effort provisions” such grants will, over time, substitute for resources that state 
and local governments would have spent anyway. The issue of assessing program performance in 
the area of federal-state and local programs is also a salient one since, at least according to 
accounts in the popular press, there is some evidence that grants for homeland security have been 
viewed in the legislative process as a new form of “pork” to be brought home by members of the 
U.S. Congress. 
Finally, this paper highlights the need for a greater understanding of the actions of state 
and local governments and private actors in response to increased security needs post-September 
11th. As the example of nuclear power illustrates, many of the costs of protecting our homeland 
may be largely invisible to the public sector, but crucial to homeland security. A greater 
understanding of these costs and their effectiveness is important in evaluating governmental 
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actions that affect private-sector behaviors, such as regulations and the provision of insurance. 
Evaluating the effectiveness and costs of homeland security policies without consideration to 
these additional actors’ behavior will only portray an incomplete picture of a nation’s efforts to 
secure the homeland. 
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